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Abstract
In this note we consider the problem whether contingent commodity al-
locations can be used when the states are not directly contractible. In such
a setting a contingent commodity allocation takes the form of a social choice
function, and the question is whether this function is implementable (in the
sense of full implementation). Using only very mild assumptions on the rule
for selecting contingent commodity allocations, we derive a strong negative re-
sult which also proves to be robust with respect to dierent solution concepts
employed for implementation. These ndings have interesting implications for
the interpretation of Arrow{Debreu economies.
JEL classication numbers: D50
Keywords: Contingent Commodities, Implementation, Single-Crossing

We thank F. Forges, A. Mas-Colell, R. Repullo, A. Sen, and W. Trockel for helpful comments.
y
This author gratefully acknowledges nancial support from the Spanish government under the
CICyT grant PB94-1504.
z
This author gratefully acknowledges nancial support from the Spanish government under the
CICyT grant PB93-940.
x
This author gratefully acknowledges nancial support by the EU through a TMR grant under
Contract No. ERBFMBICT960626 during his stay at the University of Alicante, as well as the
hospitality of the SFB 303 at the University of Bonn and the Institute of Mathematical Economics
at Bielefeld University. Correspondence to: Jorg Naeve, MRSH, Bureau 231, Universite de Caen,
14032 Caen cedex, FRANCE, e-mail: jnaeve@econ.unicaen.fr
1
1 Introduction
The Arrow{Debreu model, i. e., a general equilibriummodel with location, date, and
state contingent commodities, is often considered to be a benchmark for the realiza-
tion of ecient resource allocation; in recent years its usage has become pervasive,
particularly in macroeconomics. The cautionary tales that are told regarding the
suitability of the model are usually framed in terms of imperfections like noncon-
vexities, thin markets, transactions costs, and asymmetries of information among
agents. But it is accepted that if the economic situation to be modeled is immune
to these imperfections, and the states of nature are \macroeconomic," then the
Arrow{Debreu model is an acceptable approximation to reality. Our concern here is
a precise formulation of the idea that a state is macroeconomic. We make the point
that for the model to \work," the states have to be contractible so that an outside
observer (the auctioneer in the Arrow{Debreu model) can independently verify the
occurrence of a state.
When we say that the model \works" we mean that there is a mechanism which
gives incentives in the right way so as to generate, or implement, the outcomes of
the Arrow{Debreu model as the equilibria of a game without introducing any new
outcomes (technically speaking, full implementation). As is well known, the Wal-
rasian correspondence can be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium
1
by a number
of mechanisms so it would appear that, by a standard extension of the commodity
space using (state) contingent commodities, so can Arrow{Debreu equilibrium allo-
cations. We show that such is not the case. We follow up on an early example due to
Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) and show that the basic intuition given by them holds
much more generally and for all the solution concepts that have been considered
in the literature on implementation. Essentially, given preferences over contingent
commodities, the planner comes up with a rule to assign commodities to agents as
a function of the Arrow{Debreu state of nature; if the rule gives an Arrow{Debreu
equilibrium allocation then it is ex-ante Pareto optimal. However, once nature has
moved, and all the agents are told what nature's move has been, and this is com-
mon knowledge, for the planner to be able to assign commodities in the state that
nature has chosen, the planner needs to know what nature did. The implementa-
tion model does not a priori give the planner this information; consequently, the
planner must elicit this information regarding nature's choice of the Arrow{Debreu
state from the symmetrically informed agents. But at this stage agents have very
dierent incentives relative to the ex-ante stage with the end result that under very
mild assumptions on the class of economies considered, the allocation rule is not im-
plementable. Hence, unless the planner is able to directly verify the Arrow{Debreu
state, an Arrow{Debreu equilibrium allocation cannot be realized.
We emphasize that the strong negative result goes through for all the standard
game theoretical equilibrium concepts, so the consideration of stage games and sub-
game perfection does not help, and it goes through for any ex-ante Pareto optimal
1
Subject to certain technicalities having to do with allocations which are on the boundary of
some agent's consumption set.
rule that satises an interiority assumption.
One can ask what we learn from such a result. One always pauses and gives some
thought to the appropriateness of using the Arrow{Debreu model in a particular
situation; our result allows one to have a tighter feeling for the appropriateness since
it says that the Arrow{Debreu model can be used provided the analyst is convinced
that the uncertainty in his/her model gives rise to states which are veriable by
outside observers (earthquakes and other natural calamities, etc.). The relevant
asymmetry of information is between agents and courts and not just between agents
as emphasized in the earlier literature (see, e. g., Radner (1968)).
2 The Model
We consider the standard model of an Arrow{Debreu economy with uncertainty. We
have a nite set I = f1; : : : Ig of agents and a nite set L = f1; : : : ; Lg of physically
dierent goods. The economy exists for two periods. At date 0 there is uncertainty
about which of the possible states of the world from the nite set S = f1; : : : ; Sg
will be realized at date 1, while we assume that at this date the realized state
of the world will become common knowledge among the agents. The commodity
space is R
LS
, a typical element of which is a contingent commodity vector x =
(x
1;1
; : : : ; x
L;1
; x
1;S
; : : : ; x
L;S
), where the component x
l;s
is to be interpreted as x
l;s
units of good l if at date 1 state s has occurred. An allocation in this economy is
x 2 R
LSI
. We shall consistently use superscripts to refer to agents in the economy.
Hence we write x =
 
x
1
; : : : ; x
I

, where x
i
2 R
LS
, for all i 2 I. Sometimes it will
be convenient to have the following shorthand notation available. Let x 2 R
LS
and
s 2 S, then we write x
s
= x
;s
= (x
1;s
; : : : ; x
L;s
). Analogously, we write x
l
, x
i
, x
i
s
,
etc.
Each agent i is characterized by her consumption set X
i
= R
LS
+
, her initial
endowments !
i
2 R
LS
+
and her preferences 
i
on the consumption set. We will only
consider preferences which can be represented by a utility function and hence will
characterize agent i by her utility function u
i
: X
i
! R. Indeed, for this note we will
assume that agents maximize expected utility, i. e., that each agent has a subjective
probability distribution q
i
over the states and a state dependent utility function
v
i
: R
L
+
 S ! R such that for all x 2 R
LS
we have u
i
(x) =
P
s2S
q
i
(s) v
i
(x
s
; s);
the conceptual importance of this assumption for our approach will become clear at
the beginning of the next section. Moreover, we assume that agents' utility functions
are monotone and smooth, i. e., at least once continuously dierentiable (C
1
), where
the latter assumption should be viewed as merely technical.
Given agents' consumption sets and initial endowments, we will restrict attention
to contingent commodity allocations x for which we have x
i
2 X
i
, for all i 2 I, and
P
i2I
x
i
=
P
i2I
!
i
. Such allocations will be called feasible and the set of all feasible
allocations will be denoted byA. Clearly, a contingent commodity allocation x 2 A
can be equivalently written as a function x : S ! R
LI
; s 7! x(s) = x
s
.
The usual way of interpreting a contingent commodity allocation x 2 A is as
a contract signed at date 0, i. e., when agents know their preferences but the state
of the world to prevail at date 1 has not been determined yet. At date 1, every
agent receives the quantity specied by such a contract. So, in this interpretation,
states are assumed to be \contractible". In this note we explore the consequences
of dispensing with that assumption. Given that we do not assume the states of
the world to be contractible, and that contingent commodity allocations can be
interpreted as social choice functions x : S ! R
LI
, we have to ask whether these
social choice functions can be implemented. So the question that interests us is,
given a contingent commodity allocation, is it possible to design a mechanism in
such a way that for every state s the equilibrium messages of the agents lead to the
outcome prescribed by the contingent commodity allocation for that state?
Notice that, contrary to the usual implementation problem, we will assume that
ex ante preferences are xed and given; what changes, the underlying \economy",
is the Arrow-Debreu state of the world which determines ex post preferences.
In formalizing the implementation problem sketched above, we will follow the
general practice in the implementation literature and assume that endowments are
constant. In our context this means that agents' endowments do not vary with the
state of the world, i.e., ! is such that for all pairs (s; t) 2 S  S we have !
s
= !
t
.
A mechanism takes the form g = (M;f), where M =
Q
i2I
M
i
is the message space
and f : M ! R
LI
the outcome function. The messages are meant to convey
information concerning the realized state of the world, the outcome function then
determining an allocation for that state. Given agents' preferences, and a state
s, the mechanism g induces a non-cooperative game  
s
in which M
i
is player i's
strategy set and her payo function is given by v
i
(; s)  f . It is at this point that
the assumption of expected utility maximization becomes important. It allows us
to consider separately the situation in any given state ex post, because preferences
in a state do not depend on allocations in other states.
Denition 2.1
Let E(s) denote the set of equilibria of  
s
for a given equilibrium concept.
2
We say
that a mechanism g implements the social choice function x in that equilibrium if,
for all states s 2 S, we have
f (E (s)) = x (s) :
In general, we are not interested in implementing just any contingent commodity
allocation but rather want to focus on those that are suggested by some solution
concept or social choice correspondence for the type of economies we consider (think,
for example, of Arrow-Debreu equilibria).
2
For a good discussion of implementation in Nash Equilibrium and dierent renements, see
the survey articles of Maskin (1985) or Moore (1992); also, confer Matsushima (1988) and Abreu
and Sen (1991) for the alternative concept of virtual implementation.
3 An Impossibility Result
In this section we will show that there exist economies such that no solution F sat-
isfying some very mild conditions is implementable on a set of economies containing
them. Essentially, what we demonstrate is that there exists a general conict be-
tween ex ante considerations and implementability. That this is possible was rst
noticed by Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) for Arrow-Debreu equilibria.
3
In fact the following proposition states that if agents utility functions on spot
markets do not depend on the state (a common assumption in the literature), the
only contingent commodity allocations implementable by any equilibrium concept
are the constant ones, that is, they give the same commodity bundles to an agent
in every state of the world.
Proposition 3.1
Assume that agents have state independent spot market utility functions, i. e., their
utility functions have the form
u
i
(x) =
X
s2S
q
i
(s) v
i
(x
s
) :
Let  : S  R
LI
be a social choice correspondence. If  is implementable (in any
equilibrium concept) it has to be constant, that is,
(s) = (t) ; 8 s; t 2 S :
Proof:
Let g = (M;f) be a mechanism implementing  so that we have
f (E (s)) =  (s) 8 s 2 S : (1)
Given the assumption on agents' preferences, for any two states s and t, the non-
cooperative games  
s
and  
t
induced by the mechanism g in that state coincide;
in particular, the outcome function for agent i 2 I is v
i
 f . Therefore, the sets of
equilibria of these games also have to coincide. Hence
E (s) = E (t) 8 s; t 2 S ;
and thus from equation (1)
(s) = (t) ; 8 s; t 2 S :

3
In their paper implementation in Bayesian equilibrium is considered, which does not t into
our model. Examining the example they present (cf. Palfrey and Srivastava (1989, Example 1, p.
129) it turns out, however, that the example treats the case of Nash implementation.
While Proposition 3.1 tells us that for certain preferences the only implementable
social choice correspondences are constant ones, the example of Palfrey and Srivas-
tava (1989) is an economy of the kind considered in the proposition
4
but such that
what we would like to implement, namely the unique Arrow{Debreu equilibrium
allocation, is not constant.
In fact we can show that there are economies with state independent spot market
utility functions for which no interior ex ante Pareto optimal contingent commodity
allocation is constant; hence, there exists a conict between implementability and
ex ante Pareto optimality (for interior allocations).
Proposition 3.2
There exist economies E =
 
(X
i
; u
i
; !
i
)
i2I

such that no ex ante Pareto optimal,
interior contingent commodity allocation x 2 R
LSI
++
is implementable.
Proof:
We will construct such an economy. For i 2 I, let X
i
= R
LS
and let the utility
function u : R
LS
! R be dened by
u
i
(x) =
X
s2S
q
i
(s) v
 
x
s

;
where v : R
L
+
! R is a monotone, strictly concave, and dierentiable spot market
utility function that is independent of the state. Consider two states of the world
s; s
0
2 S with s 6= s
0
and let the probabilities in agents' utility functions be such
that for all i; j 2 I, i 6= j, we have q
i
(s)q
j
(s
0
) 6= q
i
(s
0
)q
j
(s). For all other states the
probabilities can be chosen arbitrarily.
Let

x 2 R
LSI
be an interior Pareto optimal allocation. Then

x solves the follow-
ing maximization problem for some  =
 

1
; : : : ; 
I

, with  0 and
P
i2I

i
= 1.
max
x2R
LSI
+
X
i2I

i
X
s2S
q
i
(s) v
 
x
i
s

s.t.
X
i2I
 
!
i
  x
i

 0
Monotonicity of the utility functions allows us to write the constraint as an equality.
The rst order conditions for this problem are
@v
@x
l
(x
i
s
)
@v
@x
l
 
x
j
s

=

j

i
q
i
(s)
q
j
(s)
:
Now consider the two states s; s
0
2 S identied above. If the allocation

x assigned
the same spot market allocation in both these states of the world, we would have in
particular, for all i; j 2 I, i 6= j, and for all l 2 L,
@v
@x
l
(

x
i
s
)
@v
@x
l
 

x
j
s

=
@v
@x
l
(

x
i
s
0
)
@v
@x
l
 

x
j
s
0

;
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Notice that, in the example in Palfrey and Srivastava (1989), agent 1's utility function can
equivalently be written as
1
3
log(x
1
) +
2
3
log(x
2
).
while by assumption

j

i
q
i
(s)
q
j
(s)
6=

j

i
q
i
(s
0
)
q
j
(s
0
)
:
This would lead to a contradiction.
Therefore, it must be the case that

x
s
6=

x
s
0
. But then it follows from Proposition
3.1 that

x is not implementable.

As it stands, Proposition 3.2 does not state that no ex ante Pareto optimal
solution is partially (ex post) implementable, since it assumes interiority of the
allocations.
4 A Positive Result
We have seen in Proposition 3.1 that state independent spot market utility functions
impose severe conditions on implementable contingent commodity allocations. So,
obviously, if we look for positive results, we have to allow for state dependence of
the spot market utility functions.
In what follows, we will focus on implementability in Nash equilibrium for which
Maskin monotonicity introduced by Maskin (1977) is a necessary condition, which
together with no veto power proves to be also sucient for implementability with
three or more agents. If we assume agents' preferences to be monotonic, no veto
power is vacuously fullled, so that Maskin monotonicity becomes both a necessary
and sucient condition. Dening the lower contour set of a spot market commodity
bundle x 2 R
L
in state s 2 S for the spot market utility function v
i
as L (x; s; v
i
) =

y 2 R
L
: v
i
(y; s)  v
i
(x; s)
	
, Maskin monotonicity in our context reads as follows.
Denition 4.1
A contingent commodity allocation x is Maskin monotonic if for all states s; s
0
2 S
we have that L (x
i
s
; s; v
i
)  L (x
i
s
; s
0
; v
i
), for all i 2 I, implies x
s
0
= x
s
.
For the special case of L = 2 the well known strict Spence{Mirrlees single-
crossing property provides a condition which, if satised by all agents' utility spot
market functions v
i
: R
L
 S ! R, ensures that Maskin monotonicity is trivially
satised because the situation for which the property bites never occurs.
Denition 4.2
An agent's spot market utility function v
i
: R
2
+
S satises the strict Spence-Mirrlees
single-crossing property if there is an ordering of S such that s > s
0
implies
@v
i
(s; x)
@x
1
.
@v
i
(s; x)
@x
2
>
@v
i
(s
0
; x)
@x
1
.
@v
i
(s
0
x)
@x
2
for all x 2 R
2
++
and for all s; s
0
2 S.
The strict single-crossing property readily admits an economic interpretation.
As an example, let the two goods be umbrellas and sun-lotion and let there be two
states of the world, rain and sunshine. It seems more than reasonable to assume
that agents' marginal rates of substitution between umbrellas and sun-lotion change
unambiguously with the weather, everybody being willing to exchange more sun-
lotion for an umbrella in case it rains than on a hot and sunny summer day; that is,
in this example, strict single-crossing is satised with the same order on the states
of the world for all agents.
With the above denition in place we have the following result.
Proposition 4.3
Let L = 2, I  3, and E 2 E be an economy in which there is at least one agent
whose spot market utility function satises the strict single-crossing property.
5
Then
any social choice correspondence F yielding interior allocations is partially Nash
implementable on E.
Proof:
The proof follows immediately from the inspection of Figure 1 which depicts the
indierence curves of agent i 2 I in two states s and s
0
2 S through x
i
s
. The left
Figure 1: Single Crossing Property and Lower Contour Sets
-
6
x
1
x
2
0
c
x
i
s
r
y
Case 1: s > s
0
-
6
x
1
x
2
0
c
x
i
s
r
y
Case 2: s < s
0
picture, Case 1, shows the situation if s > s
0
in the order on S corresponding to
agent i. The bold line is the indierence curve in state s, which is steeper than the
thin line depicting the indierence curve in state s
0
. Case 2, s < s
0
, is drawn on
4
It is intuitively clear, that the strict single-crossing property is robust, i. e., that a slight
perturbation of the preferences does not destroy the property. Indeed, this can be made precise
using the techniques presented in Mas-Colell (1985).
the right, the bold line again depicting the indierence curve in state s. The lower
contour sets are the areas below the indierence curves.
In both cases the point y lies in L (x
i
s
; s; v
i
) but not in L (x
i
s
; s
0
; v
i
) which il-
lustrates, that the condition in the denition of Maskin monotonicity cannot be
satised for spot market utility function satisfying the strict Spence-Mirrlees single-
crossing condition. Thus Maskin monotonicity is trivially satised for any contingent
commodity allocation.

Remark 4.4
Proposition 4.3 can be easily generalized to cover the case in which there are more
than two goods. Also, instead of having one agent whose preferences fulll the strict
single crossing property for all states and all points in (spot market) commodity
space, it would be enough to have, for any pair of states and any point in ( spot
market) commodity space, at least one consumer whose preferences satisfy the strict
single crossing property locally. This consumer can vary among states and across
commodity bundles.
5 Concluding Remarks
How should the results we have obtained be interpreted? In the case in which utili-
ties are state independent and separable across states (a case usually assumed in the
literature), they tell us that for the Arrow{Debreu model of contingent commodi-
ties to make sense, one needs to assume that the states of the world are directly
contractible. In other words, the use of contingent commodities presupposes the
existence of some institution which is able to verify the state of the world and to
enforce transactions agreed on ex ante.
This general message is qualied by the positive result of Section 4 which shows,
that insisting on contractibility of the states of the world can become unnecessary,
if utilities are state dependent and satisfy the strict single crossing property.
Given the observation that, in general, use of the Arrow-Debreu model assumes
the existence of an institution able to enforce contingent commodity allocations, it
may be worthwhile to reconsider the model of Radner (1968) in which agents are
endowed with information structures, i. e. partitions of the set of possible states
of the world, where each element of the partition of an agent is to be interpreted
as a set of states of the world among which this agent is unable to distinguish at
the time of delivery. Radner argues that in this model the possible trades among
the agents have to be measurable with respect to the join of their information
structures. Our result seems to suggest that this condition is not as convincing
as it may seem. If states of the world have to be directly contractible, i. e. veriable
by an institution which enforces contingent contracts, measurability with respect to
agents' information structures is neither necessary nor sucient, the only relevant
thing being that all transactions be measurable with respect to the information
structure of the institution.
We briey remark that combining our ndings about ex post implementation,
i. e. implementation of sets of contingent commodities, with the classical results on
ex ante implementation, e. g. of the Walrasian correspondence seems an interesting
endeavour. But formalizing this by simply considering a two stage implementation
process, by combining the results on ex ante and ex post implementation, does not
suce since in the resulting extensive form mechanism new strategic possibilities
arise that were not present when considering each of the two stages separately. We
hope to deal with this line of research in the future.
We end this note by mentioning that additional problems arise if we consider
implementing a social choice correspondence (SCC). In this case the SCC must
satisfy a closedness requirement (cf. Palfrey and Srivastava (1989)); however, it
can be shown by means of simple examples that the Pareto and the Arrow-Debreu
correspondences are not closed and, hence, not implementable.
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The examples refered to are available from the authors upon request.
